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Traditional, Democratic, Accountable? 
Navigating Citizen-Subjection in Rural 
South Africa 
Robin L. Turner 
Abstract: Nearly two decades after South Africa’s democratization, 
questions of tradition and accountability continue to trouble the polity as 
more than 14 million black South Africans remain subject to state-recog-
nized, so-called “traditional” leaders – kings, queens, chiefs and regents. 
This article deepens our understanding of contemporary governance by 
exploring the agency of these citizen-subjects through close examination 
of traditional leaders’ strategies and citizen-subjects’ mobilizations in four 
rural localities. These cases illustrate how citizen-subjects are working 
with, against and through traditional leaders and councils, hybrid organi-
zations and independent groups to pursue community development and 
effective, accountable governance, and show how the present governance 
framework enables traditional leaders to block or undermine collective 
initiatives. In drawing attention to citizen-subjects’ agency and their diffi-
culties in holding traditional leaders accountable, this analysis of contem-
porary traditional governance underscores the need for further democra-
tizing reforms. 
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Nearly two decades after South Africa’s democratization, questions of 
tradition and accountability continue to trouble the polity. Although the 
nominally independent black Bantustans were formally reincorporated 
and universal suffrage was adopted during the transition from apartheid, 
governance remains fragmented by place and by race as 14.5 million 
black South Africans remain subject to state-recognized so-called “tradi-
tional leaders” – kings, queens, chiefs, regents, headmen and headwomen 
(South African Government News Agency 2013). The 1996 Constitution 
not only contained an expansive bill of rights and established a tiered 
system of multiparty representative government but also recognized 
“traditional leaders”, “traditional authorities” and “customary law”.1 The 
Traditional Leadership Governance and Framework Act of 2003 re-
tained the traditional leaders, tribes (now called “traditional communi-
ties”), tribal authorities (“traditional councils”) and boundaries in place at 
that time (see Figures 1 and 2). In consequence, 28 per cent of the pop-
ulation is placed in a condition I term “citizen-subjection”: These people 
nominally possess the political, civil and social rights to which all citizens 
are entitled but are concurrently and officially subject to unelected tradi-
tional leaders.2 
This article deepens our understanding of contemporary democratic 
governance by exploring people’s agency in contexts of citizen-subjec-
tion. I present a close analysis of traditional governance and the actions 
of citizen-subjects in four rural South African localities in order to high-
light the creativity with which rural people navigate their situations, and 
to draw attention to the considerable constraints that citizen-subjects 
encounter. These cases not only illustrate the varied ways in which rural 
citizen-subjects continue to assert their agency and engage in collective 
action but also underscore the need for further traditional governance 
reforms by illustrating how difficulties in holding traditional leaders ac-
countable reduce the efficacy of local initiatives.  
1  I often use the official terminology of traditional leaders, communities and coun-
cils without quotation marks in this article. However, these institutions are neither 
traditional nor customary in the ordinary language meaning of these words, as 
discussed in subsequent sections, and communities are often deeply divided (on 
community, see Turner 2013: 510; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Gupta and Fer-
guson 1992). 
2  Formal entitlement to full civil and political rights distinguishes citizen-subjection 
from the racialized and ethnicized subjection Mahmood Mamdani described in 
Citizen and Subject (1996). 
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Post-apartheid South Africa has a dual governance system com-
prised of national, provincial and municipal governance institutions led 
by elected officials, and of “traditional” institutions led by unelected 
traditional leaders. Contemporary traditional leaders exert substantial – 
albeit ill-defined and contested – authority within the boundaries of their 
so-called traditional communities, presiding over meetings, resolving 
disputes, interpreting customary law, allocating communal land, mediat-
ing between external actors and their subjects and granting or withhold-
ing support for development initiatives.3 The present system closely re-
sembles the colonial and apartheid system condemned by Mahmood 
Mamdani in Citizen and Subject. During colonialism and apartheid, Mamdani 
(1996) argued, citizenship was racialized, subjection was ethnicized, and a 
system of “decentralized despotism” in which black rural people were 
ruled through unaccountable chiefs was established. An extensive literature 
shows that twentieth- and twenty-first-century African traditional institu-
tions are decidedly non-traditional: Non-indigenous governments and tra-
ditional leaders have repeatedly reshaped and restructured traditional in-
stitutions over time (see, for example, Schapera 1970; Comaroff 1974; 
Crais 2006; Oomen 2000; 2005). In the case of South Africa, appoint-
ment to traditional leadership positions came to depend upon non-cust-
omary officials such as the governor-general-in-council of South Africa, 
the president of South Africa and the leaders of the various Bantustans 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At present, traditional 
leaders are selected by royal families and appointed by government offi-
cials.4 Many customary constraints on chiefly authority were removed, 
“traditional” authorities were imposed upon groups with other forms of 
governance, and boundaries were sometimes altered by the state.  
South Africans exhibit considerable discontent with the present sys-
tem of traditional governance. As Lungisele Ntsebeza (2005b) contends, 
In so far as so-called traditional leadership is based on ascribed her-
editary rule, the possibility of rural residents having the freedom to 
choose which institution and/or individuals should rule them is 
automatically excluded. (78)  
3  There is deep disagreement regarding whether, how, and to what extent tradi-
tional leaders should exercise authority in these domains (e.g. LRG 2010; Sithole 
2011; Claassens and Cousins 2008; Ntsebeza 2005a; Holomisa 2011; Weeks 2011; 
Williams 2012). 
4  The Traditional Leadership Governance and Framework Act defines the “royal 
family” as the “immediate relatives of the ruling family […] who have been identi-
fied in terms of custom”, and it permits the inclusion of other close relatives 
(1[1(b)]).  
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Other citizen-subjects have expressed similar views at national and pro-
vincial public hearings and in comments on proposed legislation.5 At the 
2010 Public Hearings on the Black Authorities Act Repeal Bill, for ex-
ample, Nomonde Mbelekane of the Rural People’s Movement (2010) 
asserted: 
As women, we do not really like chiefs that much. We voted for a 
democracy of the people by the people. We did not vote for indi-
viduals. We did not vote for apartheid. […] We prefer municipali-
ties. We see abuse only from chiefs. We do not want the govern-
ment of the chiefs in rural areas. 
From this perspective, subjection to traditional leaders denies one full 
citizenship. 
Several factors jointly account for the survival of state-recognized, 
state-supported, minimally reformed traditional leadership beyond apart-
heid’s demise. First, the conditions and structure of South Africa’s tran-
sition negotiations facilitated the continued recognition of traditional lead-
ers (Oomen 2000, 2005; Beall et al. 2005; Koelble and LiPuma 2011). The 
pressing need to reduce political violence in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, 
and thus to accommodate some of the demands made by Chief Man-
gosuthu Buthelezi of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), affected the nego-
tiation climate, as did the inclusion of traditional leaders in the transition 
negotiations (Oomen 2005). Second, the stance taken by the African Na-
tional Congress (ANC) towards traditional leaders shifted as it began plan-
ning for a post-apartheid future. Although many ANC-aligned activists 
viewed traditional leaders as “enemies of the liberation struggle”, “the 
ANC’s ambition to form a broad alliance in order to isolate the IFP[,] the 
formation of the ‘democratic’ Congress of Traditional Leaders of South 
Africa (CONTRALESA)”[,] and party leaders’ desire to articulate an Afri-
can national identity all influenced the ANC’s strategic decision to work 
with traditional leaders (van Kessel and Oomen 1997: 571; Oomen 2000: 
73). The perception that traditional leaders were influential vote-brokers 
also entered into the ANC’s political calculus, as did the party’s awareness 
of its narrow rural support base (van Kessel and Oomen 1997; Koelble 
and LiPuma 2011; Beall et al. 2005). Third, traditional leaders were strong 
and effective self-advocates throughout the transition, while the rapid 
decline in civic organizations meant the latter no longer served as a coun-
terweight to the former. Traditional leaders influenced the interim and 
5  See, for example, the 2003 Public Hearings on the Communal Land Rights Bill, 
the 2010 Public Hearings on the Black Authorities Act Repeal Bill, and the 
2012 Provincial Public Hearings on the Traditional Courts Bill.  
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final constitutions and shaped policy documents and legislation by partici-
pating in negotiations, lobbying decision-makers and threatening to disrupt 
the transition (Oomen 2005). Presenting themselves as authentic custodi-
ans of African culture, custom and identity, traditional leaders won the 
“struggle over the soul of custom” despite sustained opposition from 
activists in the fields of gender equality, land rights and democracy, as well 
as from citizen-subjects (Oomen 2005). Fourth, the international political-
economic environment facilitated the continued recognition of traditional 
leaders. South Africa’s democratization coincided not only with a global 
decline of the nation-state, a rise in “culturalism” and growing acceptance 
of group-based rights claims, but also with the global ascendance of 
neoliberalism (Oomen 2005; Koelble and LiPuma 2011; Crais 2006). The 
post-apartheid government’s neoliberal policies have sharply constrained 
its ability to create effective municipal governments that could provide an 
alternative to traditional institutions.  
Traditional leaders’ persistent efforts to preserve chiefly authority 
have met with considerable success in this context. The Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003 and the Communal 
Land Rights Act of 2004 both reinforced traditional leaders’ authority. 
The Constitutional Court invalidated the Communal Land Rights Act in 
2010. However, the 2012 reintroduction of the Traditional Courts Bill 
sent a clear signal of the government’s disinclination to reconsider its 
approach to traditional leadership. First introduced in 2008, the Tradi-
tional Courts Bill would recognize “traditional courts” in places with 
traditional leaders, would empower these courts both to decide certain 
disputes involving “custom” and to levy fines and other sanctions, and 
would reify a non-customary court hierarchy (see Weeks 2011; Gasa 
2011; Holomisa 2011). Affected parties could not have legal representa-
tion and could not have matters heard by a magistrate’s court rather than 
a traditional court. The National Council of Provinces returned this 
much-criticized bill to the provinces for further consultation in October 
2013 even though it had been rejected by five of the nine provincial 
legislatures.6 The national government’s reluctance to withdraw or sub-
stantially amend this bill suggests that traditional community residents 
will remain citizen-subjects for the foreseeable future. 
6  The Eastern Cape, Gauteng, North West, and Western Cape have opposed this 
bill since May 2012; Limpopo first sought changes and then decided to oppose 
the bill (Custom Contested 2013). Also see the page on the website of the Centre 
for Law and Society dedicated to the Traditional Courts Bill <www.lrg.uct.ac. 
za/research/focus/tcb/>.  
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This article examines rural South Africans’ agency in the context of 
their continued citizen-subjection. Research in traditional communities 
shows that many rural citizen-subjects are mobilizing to pursue effective, 
accountable governance as well as development, and it illustrates how 
they are working with, against and through traditional leaders and coun-
cils, hybrid organizations and independent groups. However, my analysis 
also underscores the need for further democratizing reforms by illus-
trating how the present structure makes citizen-subjects unduly depend-
ent on the idiosyncratic inclinations of their traditional leaders. Tradi-
tional leaders can easily block or undermine collective initiatives because 
state officials rarely respond to intervention requests, and residents of 
traditional communities have few means to hold these leaders accounta-
ble. These constraints make it difficult to sustain collective action. 
The Context 
I focus my analysis on four deep rural localities in North West Province: 
Lekgophung, Molatedi, Pitsedisulejang and Supingstad. Each locality is 
part of a traditional community in the eyes of the South African state, 
and each has a state-recognized senior traditional leader (a chief, or kgosi, 
in Tswana) (see Table 1, Figure 3). These localities also fall within the 
jurisdiction of municipal councils and are represented by elected local 
ward councillors. Lekgophung and Supingstad fall within Ramotshere 
Moiloa Local Municipality, and Molatedi and Pitsedisulejang are part of 
Moses Kotane Local Municipality. I conducted research in these locali-
ties between 2005 and 2011. I engaged in participant observation, ana-
lysed documents and conducted 182 in-depth interviews between May 
2005 and June 2006, in June and July 2010, and in July 2011. I interacted 
with a wide range of people involved in the localities: traditional leaders 
and councillors; local youth, elders and activists; elected officials and civil 
servants; and consultants and businesspeople.7  
Looking closely at Lekgophung, Molatedi, Pitsedisulejang and Sup-
ingstad provides insight into the realities of contemporary dual govern-
ance in South Africa. While these localities cannot and should not be 
considered representative of all sites of citizen-subjection, they illustrate 
the potential of and constraints upon rural agency in this context. These 
cases show how the differing strategic choices of traditional leaders and 
their citizen-subjects shape contemporary governance. I describe the dis-
7  I also interviewed other members of the multi-village Barokologadi ba ga Maotwe 
and Batlokwa boo Kgosi ba ga Matlapeng traditional communities.  
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tinctive ways in which the four traditional leaders exerted authority in the 
next section.  
Table 1: State-Recognized Local Traditional and  
Municipal Structures, 2010 
Locality Traditional Community Traditional Leader  
Lekgophung Balete ba Lekgophung A. F. (Pule) Tsiepe 
Molatedi Batlokwa boo kgosi ba ga Matlapeng B. F. M. Matlapeng 
Pitsedisulejang Barokologadi ba ga Maotwe O. T. S. Maotwe 
Supingstad Bahurutse ba ga Suping S. Victor Suping 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Traditional Leadership in Practice 
Leading through Cooperation and Consultation
in Lekgophung 
I listen to the community, what they want, and then I can make a de-
cision to go on with their project. I have different committees that I 
work together with to communicate with the community, and they 
talk to me if there are problems in the community. (Kgosi Pule 
Tsiepe of Lekgophung, interview, 30 June 2005) 
The quotation above aptly summarizes Chief Tsiepe’s governance ap-
proach. Kgosi of Lekgophung from 1976 until his passing in 2011, Pule 
Tsiepe had a consultative leadership style. Residents described Kgosi 
Tsiepe as “polite” and “humble”, saying, “Our chief here works together 
with us” (interviews, 21 June 2005 and 5 October 2005). Less diplomatic 
observers described the chief and the local ward councillor as weak and 
unskilled: Kgosi Tsiepe had only a standard-six (eighth-grade) education, 
and the councillor had never held permanent employment (interviews; 
Magome et al. 2000). The kgosi’s less-than-dominant approaches left 
ample room for other residents to exert leadership.  
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Three local organizations served as the main sites for local planning 
and decision-making between 2000 and 2011: the Balete Traditional 
Council, the Lekgophung RDP8 Forum and the Balete ba Lekgophung 
Development Trust. The Balete Traditional Council mediated conflict 
and sought to maintain custom. Comprised of several officers, a repre-
sentative of the chief and two representatives of each active project, the 
Lekgophung RDP Forum coordinated all local development-oriented 
projects, mediated project disputes and solicited development support 
from government. The Balete ba Lekgophung Development Trust held 
rights to a Madikwe Game Reserve lodge concession on behalf of the 
locality, and Kgosi Tsiepe served as the founder trustee.  
Both the RDP Forum and the Balete ba Lekgophung Development 
Trust brought all major issues to the kgotla, the customary place-institu-
tion for addressing matters of public importance. Historically a semi-
democratic space in which Tswana men gathered to discuss and debate 
issues brought to them by the chief, the kgotla is now a place in which 
men and women share information, engage in collective discussion and 
sometimes make decisions (Schapera 1955; Kgotleng 2011; Lekorwe 
1989; Mangokwana 2001). The kgotla served this role in Lekgophung, a 
locality characterized by consultative governance. 
Leadership through Directive Developmentalism
in Molatedi 
There are some decisions, even if they are taken by the council or the 
community, I can overrule them when I think they are not in line 
with the general masses’ interest. (Kgosi B. F. M. Matlapeng of Mola-
tedi, interview, 15 May 2006) 
Kgosi Matlapeng has combined a directive approach with a strong focus 
on development since his appointment in 1999. Despite his belief that 
politicians “bring division” to the community, Kgosi Matlapeng worked 
with then-councillor Sam Mochine to persuade the Bojanala Platinum 
District Council to contribute 2.6 million ZAR towards construction 
costs for the Molatedi community lodge (interviews, 16 August 2005 and 
15 May 2006). The Molatedi tribal office served as the focal point for 
most new initiatives throughout the 2000s as the kgosi worked with mu-
nicipal officials, Madikwe Game Reserve businesses and villagers to im-
prove the locality. 
8  Reconstruction and Development Programme. 
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Kgosi Matlapeng welcomed the use of the kgotla to promote local 
development, to share information and to discuss new opportunities, but 
discouraged its use for partisan discussions. The kgotla was the locus of 
an extended locality-wide debate regarding a Madikwe Game Reserve 
community lodge initiative in the early 2000s. Kgosi Matlapeng strongly 
supported the initiative and sought to ensure that Molatedi accepted the 
offer. “I am putting my head on the block. […] [I told them the lodge] is 
going to proceed, with or without your involvement because we are all 
going to benefit”, he told me in 2006. It still took two to three years for 
the concession proposal to secure broad support, however (interview, 10 
June 2005). While the kgotla was often used to inform residents of new 
projects and opportunities, Kgosi Matlapeng sometimes withheld per-
mission for meetings that he believed were intended only for political 
party members or that did not accord with his interpretation of custom-
ary protocol. This stance made it difficult for some political party activ-
ists to access the kgotla but did not prevent elected officials from ad-
dressing the locality (interviews, 20/23 June 2005 and 15 May 2006). 
Molatedi’s directive traditional leader encouraged development while 
discouraging certain collective discussions and activities.  
Authoritarian Chiefly Neglect in Supingstad 
The chief of Supingstad has a problem; he don’t want development 
in the village. (Lekgophung resident, interview, 21 June 2005) 
Kgosi S. Victor Suping of Supingstad has become a nationally known 
traditional leader since his appointment to the chieftaincy in 1971 
through his service as Bophuthatswana’s Minister of Agriculture and 
Minister of Home Affairs, as Chair of the North West Province House 
of Traditional Leaders, and as a member of the executive committee for 
the South African National House of Traditional Leaders. However, 
Kgosi Suping was a deeply controversial figure in Supingstad. Despite 
the near consensus that the kgosi was one of the most skilled and capable 
traditional leaders in the region, many believed that he had not served his 
locality well: No major decisions could be made during the kgosi’s fre-
quent absences from the locality, Supingstad experienced water crises in 
the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, and Supingstad failed to 
secure a Madikwe lodge concession (interviews; also see Magome et al. 
2000; Magome and Sentle 1998). Some informants also criticized the 
kgosi for his fear-evoking and supposedly self-centred governance style, 
along with his use of violence to force obedience during apartheid (inter-
views, 13/26 July 2005 and 27 February 2006). Supingstad had an au-
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thoritarian traditional leader who focused his energy on provincial and 
national affairs.  
Contested Traditional Leadership in Pitsedisulejang 
Pitsedisulejang has suffered from a surfeit of state-recognized leaders since 
2000. Both Kgosi O. T. S. Maotwe and the former regent Moses Mmusi 
Maotwe lived within walking distance of the Pitsedisulejang kgotla, and first 
the Barokologadi Land Claims Committee and later the Barokologadi 
Communal Property Association officially represented local participants in 
the collective land restitution claim to Melorane, the place from which 
Barokologadi people were forcibly removed in 1949 and 1950.9  
Kgosi O. T. S. Maotwe’s efforts to exert authority have been compli-
cated by two factors since his appointment in 2003: One, the kgosi has a 
poor relationship with Mmusi Maotwe, T. Z. Molwantwa, and other pater-
nal relatives. The provincial government’s removal of Mmusi Maotwe 
from the regency and the appointment of O. T. S. Maotwe to the chief-
taincy before the royal family had reached consensus exacerbated these 
divisions. Two, differing conceptions of community divides these leaders, 
self-identified Barokologadi, and other citizen-subjects of the decidedly 
non-customary Barokologadi Traditional Community (see Turner 2013). 
First proclaimed in 1958, the Barokologadi “community” encompasses 
three mostly Barokologadi villages and four previously autonomous set-
tlements but excludes the largely Barokologadi village of Obakeng.  
Possessing formal authority but contested legitimacy, Kgosi O. T. S. 
Maotwe articulated an inclusive Barokologadi collective identity, worked 
closely with his local allies, and secured support from provincial officials 
and other traditional leaders. The kgosi’s Pitsedisulejang allies included 
most of the traditional councillors, youth activists and residents who had 
moved to Pitsedisulejang. The kgosi’s close cooperation with so-called 
“settlers” troubled land claim leader T. Z. Molwantwa and others who 
felt that the only true Barokologadi are those from Melorane (Turner 
2013). On 8 May 2004, for example, land claim leaders stormed out of a 
meeting after the kgosi refused to accede to their demand that a tribal 
councillor leave the meeting because he was not Barokologadi. Subse-
quently, these land claim leaders helped organize a mass demonstration 
in which participants demanded, “Kgosi Thari should as a matter of 
extreme urgency start unconditionally recognizing and working with the 
9  The Barokologadi were governed by two state-recognized regents, Edwin and 
Mmusi Maotwe, in the interregnum between the passing of Kgosi Lawrence 
Sello Maotwe in the 1980s and the appointment of his son O. T. S. Maotwe.  
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rightful borangwaneagwe [paternal uncles] and not fly-by-night types” a few 
months later (Barokologadi ba Maotwe Community Forum 2004).10 
Kgosi O. T. S. Maotwe refused to accede to demonstrators’ demands 
and garnered support for his stance from provincial officials and other 
provincial traditional leaders (interview, 5 July 2010). The kgosi’s ap-
proach buttressed his authority but did not broaden his support base.  
 
These brief descriptions illustrate the varied ways in which South African 
traditional leaders exert authority. Kgosi Tsiepe’s consultative and coop-
erative style contrasts sharply with Kgosi Matlapeng’s directive develop-
mentalism and the high-profile Kgosi Suping’s neglect of his home vil-
lage. The present ambiguity regarding traditional governance allows tra-
ditional leaders to relate to their citizen-subjects as they choose. These 
cases also show how each leader’s choices affect his (or her) popular 
legitimacy. As the next section details, the developmentalist chiefs Tsiepe 
and Matlapeng appeared to have much greater support from their citi-
zen-subjects than did Kgosi Suping and Kgosi Maotwe.11 
Navigating Citizenship and Subjection through 
Community-Based Organizations
Many rural people participate in community-based organizations as well 
as or instead of relying upon traditional leaders for development and 
social protection. Lekgophung, Molatedi, Pitsedisulejang and Supingstad 
have had numerous community-based organizations for several decades 
– mutual aid associations, school governing boards, water committees 
and cultural groups, among others. South Africa’s democratization saw 
the emergence of new organizations that claim to represent each locality, 
to speak for and act on its behalf. This section describes the strategies 
these new organizations adopted. As I will discuss, in recent years most 
activists in Lekgophung and Molatedi worked with their traditional lead-
ers while those in Supingstad and Pitsedisulejang worked against their 
chiefs.   
10  This elected traditional councillor settled in Pitsedisulejang shortly after his 1974 
marriage.  
11  Kgosi Matlapeng had less support in nearby Obakeng, which was incorporated 
into the Batlokwa Tribal Authority during apartheid. 
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Working with the Chief: Hybrid Organizations in 
Molatedi and Lekgophung 
The two leading organizations in Lekgophung and Molatedi, the Balete 
ba Lekgophung Development Trust and the Sebolao Development 
Trust, worked with their traditional leaders throughout at least the first 
decade of the 2000s. Both organizations were created in response to 
state conditions. The North West Parks and Tourism Board offered 45-
year Madikwe Game Reserve lodge concessions to Lekgophung, Mo-
latedi, Supingstad and two other nearby localities in the year 2000. These 
offers were extremely attractive, for if the community lodges succeeded, 
the concessions could foster local development by increasing employ-
ment and granting local people access to and control over a share of 
Madikwe tourism revenues.  
The North West Parks and Tourism Board relied upon the tradi-
tional leaders as intermediaries, however, and issued the offers to chiefs 
rather than communicating directly with residents. The board also re-
quired each locality to publicly discuss and accept the concession offer, 
to register a new legal entity, and to commit to direct most profits to-
wards community improvements. Lekgophung and Molatedi met these 
requirements and obtained concessions. Supingstad did not. Although 
Kgosi Suping accepted the concession on behalf of the locality, he could 
not convince board officials that his citizen-subjects had accepted the 
offer, selected representatives, and chosen a business partner through 
democratic, locality-wide processes (interviews, 6 April 2005, 3 August 
2005, 21/23 March 2006).  
Lekgophung created the Balete ba Lekgophung Development Trust 
(henceforth the Lekgophung trust), and Molatedi created the Sebolao 
Development Trust (the Molatedi trust) to hold their concessions on 
behalf of their communities. The new trusts were hybrid organizations: 
Each was formally separate from the traditional council but linked to the 
traditional leader who was named the “founder trustee”. Trust boards 
comprising each kgosi, several residents, and a few non-locals served as 
the principal decision-makers. These trustees had to make annual reports 
to residents but otherwise needed their consent only to sell, lease or 
alienate trust assets. 
The two trusts’ trajectories illustrate the benefits and hazards of 
working with traditional leaders. In the early years, the Molatedi trust 
clearly benefitted from Kgosi Matlapeng’s involvement. While the kgosi 
attended meetings only at the request of other trustees, he participated in 
meetings with outsiders, assisted in fundraising efforts, placed two tribal 
office staff at the trust’s disposal and defended other trustees against 
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criticism. In contrast, Kgosi Tsiepe was much less active in the Lek-
gophung trust and in most cases refrained from direct involvement in its 
activities, although he received reports from other trustees and was gen-
erally supportive. Other trustees thus made the crucial decisions in con-
sultation with the Lekgophung RDP Forum, residents and Mafisa, a 
private consultancy that had worked with the Lekgophung and Molatedi 
residents since the late 1990s. The Lekgophung trust relied heavily on 
Mafisa and the district municipality for administrative assistance. 
Over the next several years, the trustees worked closely with one 
another and with Mafisa to finalize their agreements with the parks and 
tourism board, to raise construction capital from public and private 
sources and to manage the lodge development process. Rather than 
attempting to manage the lodges themselves, the Lekgophung and Mo-
latedi trusts contracted with a private company to furnish, market and 
operate each lodge for a period of ten years. The lodge operator agreed 
to pay the trust’s annual concession fee, 10 per cent of lodge turnover 
(gross revenue) and a fixed, inflation-adjusted fee per tourist bed each 
year. The trusts also required every contractor to hire local people unless 
no one possessed the requisite skills. Both trusts reported their progress 
to residents and sought their consent for major decisions throughout the 
fundraising and lodge development process. 
The two trusts entered a new phase with the openings of the Lekgo-
phung lodge and the Molatedi lodge, in November 2004 and August 2006, 
respectively. Three Lekgophung trustees and two Molatedi trustees ob-
tained lodge employment and shifted their focus to their new jobs while 
the other trustees turned their attention to neglected commitments.12 The 
Lekgophung trust struggled to develop administrative capacity, relation-
ships among some Molatedi trustees broke down, the Molatedi trust began 
to meet less frequently, and both trusts were slow to issue financial re-
ports. Neither traditional leader played an active role during this difficult 
transition. 
The Lekgophung and Molatedi trusts then came under severe stress 
with the onset of the recent global financial crisis, which led to a 4.2 per 
cent global decrease in international tourist arrivals and a 5.7 per cent de-
crease in international tourism receipts (UNWTO 2010). Although occu-
pancy rates remained high at the two lodges, the lodge operator argued 
that the global downturn necessitated a change in terms and sought to 
reduce its turnover payments by 40 per cent. Neither trust quickly ac-
12  The trustees’ employment was less controversial than one might expect because 
four of the five had professional guiding or administrative experience, and 
three left better-paying jobs at private lodges. 
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cepted the operator’s proposal.13 The operator then stopped making pay-
ments, creating a financial crisis for the trusts.  
The traditional leaders of Molatedi and Lekgophung responded to 
the trust crises very differently: Kgosi Matlapeng chose to intervene 
directly while Kgosi Tsiepe maintained a hands-off approach. When the 
Molatedi trustees struggled to respond to this difficult situation, Kgosi 
Matlapeng asserted direct control over the trust. Rather than working 
with the other trustees to address this situation or seeking their consent 
for his intervention, the kgosi went first to the Batlokwa Traditional 
Council and then to Molatedi residents to seek their support for his deci-
sion. Kgosi Matlapeng justified his intervention as follows: 
The chairperson of the council is kgosi. […] This is the only 
structure in the community that has all the powers in terms of the 
law. Any other structure – committee, trust or whatever – oper-
ates under them [the traditional council]. […] When the munici-
pality isn’t properly working, government has the prerogative of 
sending someone to administer it until it is active. If a functioning 
committee doesn’t perform well, take over until it is organized. 
Then hand it back. (Interview, 8 August 2011) 
The Molatedi trust deed makes no provision for this kind of unilateral 
action. However, the kgosi then proceeded to work with his staff, outside 
advisers, and legal counsel to address the crisis. The crisis was not fully 
resolved when I left Molatedi in August 2011, but a new company had 
taken over lodge management and made a commitment to pay the funds 
owed by the previous operator. It remained unclear whether and when 
the Molatedi trustees would regain decision-making authority.  
The Lekgophung trustees retained their authority throughout the 
crisis. Drawing upon their long-time relationship with Mafisa principals, 
the Lekgophung trustees obtained independent pro bono legal and finan-
cial counsellors who helped the trustees to analyse their situation and to 
negotiate with the delinquent operator and with their lenders. Concur-
rently, the trust entered into negotiations with a trusted prior operator, 
who subsequently took over lodge marketing and operations. Both 
lodges were still operational, if not thriving, in 2013. 
13  Trustees asserted that the operator’s financial problems arose from a struggling 
new project rather than from their lodges (interviews, 8-13 August 2011). The 
proposed revisions would have left the trusts with little ability to support local 
development initiatives, as much of the income of the trusts is consumed by 
loan repayments. 
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The contrasting experiences of the Lekgophung and Molatedi trusts 
illustrate the risks and opportunities inherent in working with local tradi-
tional leaders. Because these new organizations worked with their chiefs, 
they gained access to these individuals’ insights, networks and adminis-
trative resources and received assistance in obtaining government grants 
and loans. Partnering with Kgosi Tsiepe and Kgosi Matlapeng also pro-
vided a means for the trusts to share information with residents and to 
solicit feedback from them. But working with traditional leaders also 
comes with risks, as the Molatedi case shows. Hybrid organizations may 
be vulnerable to intervention in high-pressure situations where tradi-
tional leaders may use their access to the kgotla, their control over tradi-
tional councils, and their connection to hybrid organizations to inter-
vene. While it may be possible for such organizations to resist interven-
tion by cultivating greater autonomy, doing so would require organiza-
tion leaders to work more closely and directly with other citizen-subjects 
and with government than they did in Molatedi.  
Challenging the Chief: Independent Mobilization in 
Supingstad and Pitsedisulejang 
Supingstad 
Supingstad and Pitsedisulejang illustrate both the potential and chal-
lenges of independent community activism. Supingstad was roiled by an 
uprising throughout 2005 and 2006. Led by the recently created 
Kopanang Youth Development Forum, local activists took over the 
kgotla to hold open meetings and meet with public officials, travelled to 
Mafikeng to petition provincial leaders and organized a mass meeting of 
Supingstad and Lekgophung residents.14 Youth forum leaders took an 
interest in every aspect of village life – employment, local business, crime 
and relations with Madikwe Game Reserve – and sought to involve all 
residents in their development efforts. These activists rapidly began 
making new demands upon government, which they saw as both a 
source of and a potential solution to local problems.  
The youth forum initially sought to work with Kgosi Suping, who 
had authorized the new organization and offered to facilitate its registra-
tion with the provincial youth council. However, relations between the 
forum and the chief soon broke down. Forum members came to believe 
14  Kgosi Suping’s governance was perceived to negatively affect both Lekgophung 
and Supingstad (meetings, interviews, 21 June 2005, 5 October 2005). 
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that Kgosi Suping had no interest in local development, democracy or 
accountability and instead sought to use the forum for his personal bene-
fit. In contrast, the forum placed a strong emphasis on transparent gov-
ernance. As Sinclair Rasebotso put it:  
We want to work with youth or with the community as a whole by 
calling an imbizo [a public meeting] each and every time to tell the 
people what exactly is going on in Supingstad which is what he [the 
kgosi ] does not do for a period of maybe a year, sometimes eight 
months, no imbizo for the community from the chief. (Interview, 13 
July 2005) 
From that point on, the Kopanang Youth Development Forum worked 
independently of the traditional leader and sought to build alliances with 
tribal councillors, political party activists, the Lekgophung RDP Forum, 
and the Lekgophung youth committee. The forum also held a series of 
open meetings at the Supingstad kgotla, providing a public space for 
citizen-subjects to articulate their grievances and for the forum to inform 
other locals about their activities, to secure public support for its plans, 
and to report on its expenditures.  
These activities clearly challenged Kgosi Suping’s authority. In calling 
kgotla meetings, organizing collective action, mediating conflict and serving 
as an intermediary, the youth forum took upon itself the customary roles 
and functions of a traditional leader. Indeed, the kgosi attempted to halt at 
least one meeting on the grounds that it was unauthorized. Yet, forum 
leaders refrained from openly advocating Kgosi Suping’s removal or the 
eradication of traditional authority despite their antagonism toward the 
chief. The forum also made no attempt to disrupt his kgotla meetings. 
Instead, forum leaders argued that they sought to make the kgosi more 
accountable and to press him to work for collective well-being. 
The Kopanang Youth Development Forum had established itself as 
a key political actor in Supingstad by July 2006. However, the forum had 
neither made much tangible progress towards development nor secured 
government intervention by that time, and it was unable to do so subse-
quently. Local mobilization gradually declined as it became apparent that 
the forum could not achieve the changes many citizen-subjects desired 
without support from government or the kgosi.  
Pitsedisulejang 
Pitsedisulejang has also been riven by chieftaincy-related conflicts and 
mobilizations in the 2000s. In this case, however, conflicts centred on 
activists’ efforts to augment the royal family’s influence and impose a 
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restrictive conception of Barokologadi collective identity.15 Traditional 
leadership activists first sought to secure state recognition of a newly 
created Barokologadi Royal Council. After Mmusi Maotwe became re-
gent in 1999, a committee selected by the Barokologadi royal family 
wrote a constitution granting the royal family control over all matters 
regarding the chieftaincy, including “the duration of regency”, and then 
obtained the assent of 32 Barokologadi royals and clan leaders for the 
new document. When the committee submitted the constitution to gov-
ernment in 2002, however, the Provincial Director of Traditional Lead-
ership and Institutions declared that the composition of the Barokolog-
adi Tribal Authority “flouts the procedure and provision” of the still-
operative Bophuthatswana Traditional Authorities Act 23 of 1978. The 
director also strongly implied that the constitution’s provisions were 
inconsistent with the South African Constitution and relevant laws, 
which gave government sole power to appoint chiefs and acting chiefs. 
Provincial officials then appointed O. T. S. Maotwe to the chieftaincy in 
2003 shortly after he graduated from university at age 24. 
This was the context in which disgruntled royal family members and 
other activists began using the Barokologadi Land Claims Committee to 
challenge the chief as well as to successfully pursue a collective land 
restitution claim. As the state-recognized intermediary between Barokol-
ogadi claimants and other parties, the Barokologadi Land Claims Com-
mittee was not obligated to defer to traditional leaders. The committee 
was expected to meet regularly, and meetings were open to all claimants 
and sometimes to others as well.  
The following example illustrates how activists used the committee to 
challenge the chief. In late February 2006, the Barokologadi Land Claims 
Committee announced that they would hold a meeting at the Pitsedi-
sulejang kgotla and publicized the meeting on radio before requesting the 
kgosi’s permission, as customary protocol requires. Kgosi O. T. S. Maotwe 
then failed to make the kgotla accessible, necessitating the meeting’s reloca-
tion and providing a pretext for extended public discussion of his leader-
ship. The first part of the land claim meeting was devoted to a presenta-
tion by Mmusi Maotwe in which he complained about the refusal of the 
“kgosi-to-be” to grant access to the kgotla and justified efforts to delay the 
traditional inauguration of his replacement. The former regent also de-
clared that the royal family would not discuss the kgosi’s inauguration until 
he addressed all their outstanding demands, which included a royal’s resto-
ration to the position of village headman and the acceptance of the Baro-
15  Turner (2013) discusses Barokologadi identity conflicts and land claim activism. 
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kologadi of Obakeng as part of the kgosi’s “tribe”. Several similar perora-
tions followed. The committee did not shift its focus to the land claim 
until the meeting attendees had approved a proposal to add their names to 
a related petition to the provincial premier by acclamation.16 Another 
observer told me, “They were supposed to have a claim report, but they 
got a report on the chief” (interview, 2 March 2006).  
Kgosi O. T. S. Maotwe refused to accede to these demands: He did 
not reappoint his paternal uncle to the village headmanship and continued 
to avoid involvement in Obakeng. Activists then continued their efforts to 
delay the traditional inauguration until the provincial government recon-
stituted the Barokologadi royal family. On 4 November 2006, several 
members of the Barokologadi ba ga Maotwe royal family inaugurated 
O. T. S. Maotwe as kgosi in the presence of the acting provincial premier, 
several senior traditional leaders, municipal councillors and local people. 
Neither the former regent nor Barokologadi land activist T. Z. Molwantoa 
participated in the inauguration, however, and the relationship between the 
kgosi and these relatives remained poor in 2010 despite repeated pleas that 
these leaders reconcile for the good of the Barokologadi.  
 
The Pitsedisulejang and Supingstad cases show that autonomous local 
organizations can enable citizen-subjects to express their views, to build 
support, and to make demands upon traditional leaders and the state. 
Neither the Supingstad youth activists nor the Barokologadi traditional-
ists achieved their goals, however. Barokologadi traditional leadership 
activists and land claim leaders obtained the partial restoration of Melo-
rane but could not prevent the appointment and inauguration of O. T. S. 
Maotwe. Provincial officials exercised the state’s authority of traditional 
governance to appoint O. T. S. Maotwe to the chieftaincy and to secure 
his “traditional” inauguration. 
Conclusion 
In examining contemporary citizen-subjection in South Africa and ana-
lysing the ways in which rural South Africans navigate their situation, this 
article has explored the possibilities and limitations of local agency in the 
absence of transformative policy reform. The case studies illustrate how 
traditional leaders and citizen-subjects are shaping rural governance in 
North West Province. While Lekgophung exemplifies how traditional 
16  “All who are afraid to meet with the Premier” were told to speak up immediately. 
Not surprisingly, no one did. 
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leaders can create space for local cooperative initiatives, the Molatedi 
trust’s trajectory highlights the risks inherent in working with the chief. 
The actions of youth activists in Supingstad and of Barokologadi tradi-
tionalists in Pitsedisulejang show how citizen-subjects can try to hold 
traditional leaders accountable even without supportive state policies. 
These examples highlight the positive potential of local agency. 
This article also documents how activists and self-proclaimed lead-
ers have worked with and against traditional leaders. While local trustees 
collaborated with traditional leaders to pursue development through 
nature tourism in Lekgophung and Molatedi, many citizen-subjects in 
Pitsedisulejang and Supingstad saw their chiefs as an obstacle to good 
governance and used kgotla meetings, mass mobilizations and petitions to 
express their discontent. Community-based organizations in Supingstad, 
Pitsedisulejang and other Barokologadi places became vehicles for local 
struggles. Activism can deepen existing divisions in localities. 
Close examination of contemporary South African traditional gov-
ernance thus affirms the African proverb kgosi ke kgosi ka batho (“A chief 
is a chief through the people”). Rather than affirming or refuting broad 
claims such as “We see abuse only from chiefs. We do not want the 
government of the chiefs in rural areas” or “Traditional leadership offers 
unique attributes of leadership that fulfill specific social and governance 
needs of people as communities”, the four cases underscore the need for 
more nuanced analysis (Mbelekane and Rural People’s Movement 2010; 
Sithole and Mbele 2008: 11). Although these cases provide additional 
evidence that many traditional leaders are not fulfilling their citizen-sub-
jects’ expectations and that the legitimacy of many state-recognized lead-
ers is contested, the cases also indicate that South Africa’s continued 
recognition of traditional leadership has produced diversity, not uni-
formity. Some traditional leaders are locally legitimate, and others are 
not. Some traditional leaders look after their subjects, and others do not. 
Some traditional leaders interact with their subjects in a more democratic 
way than others. South African citizen-subjects are doing their best to 
get the traditional leaders and forms of local governance they desire in 
this context. 
This analysis underscores the need for greater state responsiveness to 
citizen-subjects and for democratizing traditional leadership reforms. At 
the same time that Lekgophung, Molatedi, Pitsedisulejang and Supingstad 
illustrate how rural people are mobilizing in pursuit of collective goals, 
these cases also show that most community-based organizations cannot 
secure the transparent governance, accountability or improved well-being 
that citizen-subjects desire without state recognition and support. Local 
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mobilization may be necessary for accountable and democratic govern-
ance, but it is not sufficient. The limits of citizen-subjects’ initiative were 
particularly apparent in Supingstad, where activists repeatedly petitioned 
for state intervention to no avail. Their pleas echoed those of Prisca Shab-
alala at the Land Divided Conference17 in March 2013: “Why is the gov-
ernment ignoring us? […] Government, answer us!”  
South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution declares the state to be 
founded on democracy, constitutional supremacy and common South 
African citizenship. South Africa’s citizen-subjects want and need their 
state to act in a manner consistent with these founding provisions. Re-
storing a measure of downward accountability to traditional governance 
would be a promising step in this direction. 
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Traditionell, demokratisch, verantwortlich? Lokale Herrscher  
und unterworfene Bürger im ländlichen Südafrika 
Zusammenfassung: Fast zwei Jahrzehnte nach der Demokratisierung 
Südafrikas gelten Fragen nach traditionellen Entscheidungs- und Ver-
antwortungsbereichen immer noch als politisch problematisch, denn 
mehr als 14 Millionen schwarze Südafrikaner sind staatlich anerkannten 
sogenannten “traditionellen” Autoritäten untergeordnet – Königen und 
Königinnen, Chiefs und Regenten. Der Beitrag gewährt einen Einblick in 
diese Regierungsform. In vier ländlichen Ortschaften ermittelt die Auto-
rin die Handlungsfreiheiten betroffener Bürger, die Strategien traditio-
neller Autoritäten sowie die Formen der Mobilisierung von Bürgern. 
Diese Fallstudien zeigen, wie sich abhängige Bürger gemeinsam mit 
traditionellen Autoritäten und Gremien, hybriden Organisationen und 
unabhängigen Gruppen – aber auch über oder gegen diese – bemühen, 
die Entwicklung ihrer Gemeinden zu fördern und eine effiziente, verant-
wortliche Verwaltung zu erreichen. Sie zeigen auch, inwieweit die derzei-
tigen Machtstrukturen es traditionellen Autoritäten ermöglichen, Grup-
peninitiativen zu blockieren oder zu unterminieren. Indem sie das heu-
tige Führungsverhalten traditioneller Autoritäten analysiert und die Auf-
merksamkeit auf die Handlungsfreiheiten von Bürgern lenkt und auf 
deren Probleme, angesichts der Machtstrukturen in ihren Kommunen 
verantwortungsvolle Entscheidungen zu erreichen, belegt die Autorin die 
Notwendigkeit weiterer demokratischer Reformen. 
Schlagwörter: Südafrika, Staat, Kommunale Regierung/Verwaltung, 
Gewohnheitsrecht, Soziale Beziehungen/Soziale Kontrolle, Politische 
Partizipation 
